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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

RODNEY D. CARTER,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900303-CA

Category No. 2

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Did this Court properly conduct an analysis pursuant to
State v. Arroyo, 796 P. 2d 684 (Utah 1990), when the undisputed
facts of the case indicate that defendant freely and voluntarily
consented prior to the search of his bag and person, and this Court
found that a "seizure" occurred after that consent?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are
directly pertinent to this petition for rehearing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Rodney Carter, was charged with possession of
a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(1990) (R. 6). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized after a warrantless search of his person (R. 24). Upon the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion, defendant entered a
plea of not guilty.

Defendant was convicted of the charge and was

sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State

Prison.

The sentence was suspended in lieu of thirty-six months

probation under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole (R.
130, 142).
On appeal, this Court reversed, finding that defendant
had been seized in violation of the fourth amendment. State v.
Carter, No. 900303-CA (Utah Ct. App. March 20, 1991) (a copy of the
opinion is attached hereto in the addendum).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A complete statement of facts is included in the State's
responsive brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court chose to focus its inquiry on when defendant
was "seized" for fourth amendment purposes and determined that the
"seizure" occurred "at least" at the time defendant was patted
down, which was after defendant consented to the search of his bag
and person.

However, this Court erroneously analyzed the case as

though the "seizure" preceded the consent and consequently found
that the consent, though given freely and voluntarily, was not
sufficiently attenuated from the prior police illegality

(the

"seizure") to purge the taint of that illegality.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact. Utah R.
App. P. 35(a); Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73; 129 P.
619, 624 (1913).

The argument portion of this petition will
-2-

demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is properly
before the Court and should be granted.
POINT I
In analyzing the police-citizen encounter in the instant
case, this Court has chosen to focus its inquiry on determining
when police officers "seized" defendant thereby triggering fourth
amendment protections.

In so doing, this Court made the following

critical conclusion:
[W]e believe a reasonable person would not have felt free
to leave at the point where he had been stopped and
detained by two men who identified themselves as
narcotics officers and one officer searched his person
while the other was already simultaneously searching his
belongings. We therefore conclude that defendant was
seized for purposes of the fourth amendment at least at
the point where [Lieutenant] Fullmer conducted a pat-down
search of defendant.
Carter, slip op. at 9.

Absent from the Court's statement was the

equally critical fact that, prior to the officers' search of
defendant's bag and person (i.e. prior to the point when the
"seizure" occurred, according to this Court's determination),
defendant voluntarily consented to both searches.1
As this Court has recognized, "'one of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.'"
Id. at 12 (quoting Scneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973)).

When that consent precedes conduct that otherwise would

be violative of the fourth amendment, the inquiry need go no
1

This Court found that the trial court's finding that
defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the searches was
substantially supported by the record. Carter, slip op. at 14.
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further. In such a situation, a search is permissible, and such is
the situation in the present case.

This Court has not concluded

that the seizure of defendant occurred at the time the police
officers identified themselves as narcotics officers and requested
defendant's consent to search but that it occurred thereafter when
the pat-down search was conducted. The view that identification as
narcotics officers and a request for consent alone constitute a
seizure under the fourth amendment has been adopted by several
federal circuit courts, as cited by this Court. See State v.
Poitier, 818 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1006
(1988); United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 751-52 (5th Cir.
1988), overruled on other grounds, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990); but
see United States v. Galberth, 846 F.2d 983, 990 (5th Cir. 1988)
(which

suggests

that voluntary consent removes

the need

for

reasonable suspicion—"Although the officer's request for Galberth
to allow him to examine her purse and bag for narcotics may be
argued

to

have

elevated

the

discussion

to

a

"Terry- type"

detention, . . . she voluntarily consented to the examination.").
However, the better position, that the mere identification of
persons as police or narcotics officers and a request for consent
to search does not constitute a seizure, has been adopted by
numerous other jurisdictions.

See, e.g., United States v. Lewis,

921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Kelly v. United States, 580 A.2d
1282 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990); see also
585 A.2d

1348, 1357

Guadalupe v. United States,

(D.C. Ct. App.

1991)

(where the court

specifically distinguished the situation there, a case where the
-4-

police confronted the defendant a second time, over a period of
about 25 minutes, from a single, brief consensual encounter that
included identification as a narcotics agent and a request to
search).
This Court's apparent acceptance of the latter position
is sound but raises the question of why it proceeded to analyze the
case as though defendant had been improperly seized prior to his
consent.

In so doing, this Court applied the two part test

articulated in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690-91 (Utah 1990),
which requires the State to prove not only that a consent to search
was voluntarily given, but also that the consent was not obtained
through the exploitation of a prior police illegality.

That

analysis is not proper when the consensual search was not preceded
by police misconduct, as is the case here.2

In conducting that

analysis, this Court acted contrary to the undisputed facts of the
case, that defendant's free and voluntary consent preceded the
search of his bag and person, and its own determination that a

2

The State is confused and concerned by this Court's assertion
that the Arroyo analysis was entered by virtue of the State's
argument ("[W]e continue our inquiry as the state contends
defendant's voluntary consent purged any prior violation of his
fourth amendment rights." Carter, slip op. at 12). In its opening
brief and in oral argument, the State consistently argued that no
prior police illegality existed and that, therefore, an Arroyo
analysis was improper ("In the instant case, there was no
illegality on the part of police before defendant consented to the
search of his person and bag. Consequently, Arroyo does not apply
to this case. . . . " Br. of Appellee at 23). The State continues to
adhere to that position.
-5-

"seizure" occurred at the time of the pat-down,3
analysis under Arroyo, this Court concluded

As a result of

that defendant's

consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegal
"seizure" and was thereby undermined.

That conclusion, which was

the basis of this Court's decision to reverse the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress, misapprehends the facts
of this case and the law concerning consent searches.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should grant
the State's petition for rehearing and affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
Counsel for the State certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for the purposes of delay.
DATED this

\£

day of April, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

4>

JvJUSJoyw UUbUt^o

TUDITH S. H. ATHERTON
v Assistant Attorney General

3

Although the Court's language, that the seizure occurred "at
least at the point where Fullmer conducted a pat-down search of
defendant," is somewhat ambiguous, the Court did not conclude that
the seizure occurred prior to that time.
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Defendant and Appellant*.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy
Attorneys:

Ronald J. Yengich, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S. H. Atherton, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Rodney Donald Carter appeals his conviction of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(IV) (1990).
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to
suppress cocaine seized from his person, claiming narcotics
agents had violated his rights under article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution and the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution.
The trial court denied the motion and
defendant was convicted following a bench trial. We reverse.
Because the legal issues surrounding the seizure of
contraband are highly fact sensitive, we recite the facts in
detail. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
On July 17, 1989, at
approximately 5:15 p.m., Detective Bart Palmer (Palmer) of the
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office and Lieutenant Dave Fullmer
(Fullmer) of the Utah State Narcotics Agency, dressed in street

clothes, were observing passengers deplaning from an America
West flight arriving from Los Angeles via Las Vegas, in an
effort to locate drug couriers. The officers noticed defendant
as he carried a duffel bag and scanned the area but did not
appear to be looking for anyone in particular or reading signs
for directions. As defendant walked up the concourse, he looked
back in the direction of the officers three times. The officers
continued to observe defendant, losing visual contact briefly,
but then noticing him enter a bank of pay telephones. Palmer
entered the cubicle next to defendant, but was unable to hear
defendant speak during the short time defendant was in the
telephone area.
After hanging up the telephone, defendant walked to the
escalator and then quickened his pace, walking past other
people, as he rode down to the main level of the airport.
Maintaining his fast pace, defendant exited the terminal and
went to the cab stand just outside the main doors. While
Fullmer exited through another set of doors, Palmer followed
defendant and approached defendant after he had placed his bag
in a taxi and was about to enter the taxi.
Palmer identified himself as a police officer and asked if
defendant would talk with him. Defendant agreed and removed his
bag from the taxi. Palmer and defendant moved to a public area
outside the airport terminal about twenty feet from where the
taxi had been parked.
Palmer then asked to see defendant's
airplane ticket and defendant indicated he thought he had left
it on the airplane, but produced his recent ticket from Salt
Lake to Las Vegas for Palmer to examine. Palmer examined the
ticket and returned it.
Fullmer arrived near the scene as Palmer was asking
defendant for identification. Defendant indicated he did not
have any, but proceeded to look in his bag for identification
pursuant to Palmer's request. As he bent over to look in his
bag, Fullmer noticed a line protruding through defendant's
shirt. Palmer then indicated he was a narcotics officer and
asked defendant if he could search his bag. Defendant agreed.
As Palmer began searching defendant's bag, Fullmer asked
defendant if he could search his person. Defendant responded
"go ahead" and turned his back to Fullmer.
During a pat-down search, Fullmer detected two bulges in
defendant's lower abdominal area and asked what they were.
Defendant did not answer. Fullmer asked if he could see the
bulges and again defendant did not respond verbally, but this

time he lifted his shirt revealing masking tape around his
midsection going down into his pants. When asked the purpose of
the tape, defendant indicated he had injured his ribs.
The tape was below defendant's ribs starting near his
waistline and continuing into his pants. Fullmer testified he
then asked defendant if he could see the rest of the tape, and
defendant responded that he could, but stated he would rather
not do so in the public area of the terminal. Fullmer suggested
going to the airport office just inside the doors. Defendant
agreed and the three proceeded inside.
Once in the airport office, defendant refused an invitation
to sit and told the officers "you've got me, you might as well
have this," revealing the packages on his lower abdomen which
contained cocaine. Defendant was then arrested.
Defendant claims his rights under article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution and the fourth and fourteenth amendments
of the United States Constitution were violated.
Defendant
argues the police did not have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to detain him and that he did not voluntarily consent
to the search of his person.
Initially, the state responds that the exchange between the
officers and defendant was a constitutionally permissible
voluntary encounter.
The state continues that when the
encounter advanced to the point where defendant did not feel
1. Although defendant argues that article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution provides greater protection from unlawful
search and seizure than the fourth amendment, he does not offer
a specific analysis, but merely cites State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460 (Utah 1990), for the conclusory proposition that Utah has
abandoned "tailgating" Supreme Court cases. While Larocco did
diverge from previously identical state and federal search and
seizure analyses in Utah, it did so specifically in the area of
automobiles.
Defendant offers no rationale as to why our
analysis of the issues in the instant case should likewise
diverge from the federal analysis. Where a defendant fails to
support his state constitutional argument with analysis or legal
authority, this court will not address it. State v. Marshall,
791 P.2d 880, 883 n.4 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d
1105 (Utah 1990).
Accordingly, we do not engage in an
independent state constitutional analysis under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

free to leave, at this point the trial court found reasonable
suspicion to believe he was involved in transporting drugs, and
that all searches were pursuant to defendant's voluntary
consent. In order to resolve the legal issues presented in this
appeal, we deal with whether there was reasonable suspicion to
detain defendant and whether his subsequent consents to search
were both voluntary and sufficiently attenuated from any prior
illegality to justify the searches.
NATURE OF POLICE ENCOUNTER
In State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court recognized three levels of police-citizen
encounters and the circumstances under which they are
constitutionally permissible.
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime and pose questions so long- as
the citizen is not detained against his
will; (2) an officer may seize a person
if the officer has an "articulable
suspicion" that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime; however,
the detention must be temporary and last
no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop; (3)
an officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
111. at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223,
230 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also State v. Jackson. 149 Utah Adv.
Rep. 64, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Smith 781 P.2d 879,
881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The first level of encounter, a "level one" encounter,
encompasses situations where an officer approaches an
individual and poses questions to the individual, so long as
the individual is not detained against his will. This court
recently stated M[a]s long as the person 'remains free to
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no
intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under
the Constitution require some particularized and objective
justification. •" Jackson, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66 (quoting
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).

In State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544), we noted that "when a
reasonable person, based on the totality of the circumstances,
remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's
investigation, but because he believes he is not free to leave,
a seizure occurs." See also State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 87). In
other words, a seizure occurs where an officer by show of
authority or physical force in some way restricts the liberty
of an individual. Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 87 (citing Mendenhall,
446 U.S. at 553).
Generally, a seizure does not occur where an officer
simply approaches an individual in public, asks questions, and
even requests identification. See, e.g., Deitman, 739 P.2d at
618; Jackson, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66; Truiillo, 739 P.2d at
88.
Standing alone, the fact that an officer identifies
himself as a police officer does not convert a consensual
encounter into a seizure. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
497 (1983).
This court has recognized circumstances that, when
considered in light of all other circumstances, tend to
indicate a seizure has occurred:
(1) the presence of several
uniformed officers; (2) the display of a weapon by an officer;
(3) physical touching of the individual; and (4) the use of
language or voice tone threatening to the individual. Jackson,
149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
Other courts have looked to additional factors in
evaluating the nature of an encounter. These factors include
the length of an interview, blocking an individual's path,
retaining an individual's travel ticket, the removal of the
defendant to a private area, statements by police that an
investigation has focused on the individual, or searching the
defendant's belongings or person.
See United States v.
Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 751-52 (5th Cir. 1988), overruled on
other grounds, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990).
Utah cases are not dispositive on the issue of what
constitutes a seizure for fourth amendment purposes in the
context of an airport stop. We therefore review a number of
insightful federal cases which have treated this topic. In
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), a plurality of the
United States Supreme Court upheld the determination of the
state appellate court that defendant was not free to leave
where he was "confined" in a small area at an airport with two

undercover narcotics agents who had indicated defendant was
suspected of transporting narcotics.
In upholding the trial
court's decision, the Court cautioned that
because
circumstances could vary endlessly, there was no "litmus paper"
test for distinguishing airport consensual encounters from
seizures, Id. at 506.
In Gonzales, the fifth circuit was faced with a situation
involving a defendant stopped in an airport by two undercover
narcotics agents who identified themselves as such and asked to
look in the gym bag defendant was carrying.
The court
concluded that although the encounter was initially a voluntary
encounter, it escalated into a seizure when the officer
informed defendant he was "working narcotics" and asked to look
in her bag. The court reasoned that at that time "a reasonable
person would no longer have felt free to leave." 842 F.2d at
752. 2
Again in United States v. Galberth, 846 F.2d 983 (5th
Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 865 (1988), the fifth circuit
addressed a situation where a defendant was stopped by
undercover narcotics officers at an airport. The court noted
that the initial encounter with defendant was permissible where
the stop was non-coercive, and defendant's identification and
ticket were returned to her shortly after they were examined by
the officers. The court further concluded that a consensual
search of defendant's handbag did not convert the encounter
into a fourth amendment seizure where the interview was
conducted in public, no coercion was involved, and the officers
did nothing to lead defendant to believe she was not free to
leave. The court did note, however, that when the officers
then requested that the defendant submit to a pat-down search,
a seizure occurred requiring reasonable suspicion. See id. at
990 n.ll.
2. On similar facts, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, applying the objective "free to
leave" standard, concluded a defendant was not seized for
fourth amendment purposes where an undercover narcotics officer
stationed at a transportation center identified himself as
such, asked for and returned identification and tickets, and
then asked to search defendant's bags. See United States v.
Smith, 901 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied,
U.S.
,
111 S.Ct. 172 (1990); &g£ also United States v. Maraah, 894
F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied.
U.S.
, 111 S.Ct.
214 (1990). (Footnote 2 continued on page 7)

In United States v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1987),
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988), the court concluded no
seizure occurred where two undercover narcotics agents stopped
a deplaning passenger, identified themselves, requested
defendant's identification, and suggested moving to a quieter
location. The court concluded, however, that the encounter
escalated into a seizure when the officers stated they
suspected defendant of carrying drugs and read defendant her
Miranda rights, because at that point a reasonable person would
not have felt free to leave.
In the instant case, two narcotics officers dressed in
plain clothes approached defendant while he was getting into a
taxi and asked to speak to him.
They directed him to a
location about twenty feet from the taxi area. The record does
not reflect that the officers carried any visible weapons or
acted in an intimidating manner.
Palmer, the officer who
initially approached defendant, asked defendantmfor his ticket
and identification, and after receiving a ticket returned it.
Palmer then identified himself as a narcotics officer and asked
to look in defendant's bag. Immediately after defendant agreed
to allow Palmer to search his bag, Fullmer asked defendant if
he could search defendant's person, and after defendant agreed,
conducted a pat-down search of his person.
In ruling on defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine
obtained in the search of defendant's person, the trial judge
carefully articulated exactly when he found the officers had
reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was engaged in
criminal conduct, but the judge did not address the precise
issue of whether or when the encounter progressed to a level
two seizure. Thus, we have no determination to review.3
(Footnote 2 continued)
Recently, another court that had previously adopted the
Maraah approach held that a defendant was seized, as a
reasonable man would not have felt free to leave where he had
been approached at a train station by narcotics agents who
questioned him, asked to search his bag, allowed him to leave,
and then stopped him about fifteen minutes later and asked to
do a body search of defendant and his companion. See Guadalupe
v. United States, No. 89-793 (D.C. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1991).
3. The parties do not refer us to, nor were we able to locate
any prior Utah authority defining the precise standard to be

Instead, the judge focused on the issue of defendant's consents
to search and whether defendant's consents were voluntary.4
(Footnote 3 continued)
employed in appellate review of a trial court's determination
of when a seizure occurs. Although we need not apply a
standard of review in this case because of the trial court's
failure to address the specific issue of when a seizure
occurred, we note that a trial court's ultimate determination
of whether on particular facts an encounter amounts to a
seizure under the fourth amendment has been held to be a legal
conclusion and thus afforded no deference on appeal, but
reviewed under a correction of error standard.
See United
States v. Maraah, 894 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied,
U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 214 (1990) ("It does not matter
that Mendenhall requires the courts to consider whether a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave- 'in view of all
the circumstances surrounding the incident.'
Although
Mendenhall's seizure test 'is necessarily imprecise' and
'flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police
conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for
consistent application from one police encounter to the next,
regardless of the particular individual's response to the
actions of the police.'
Us. novo review helps to ensure
'consistent application.'") (citations omitted).
We find this approach analytically sound. Although the
factual circumstances articulated in findings which lead to the
ultimate determination that a seizure has occurred should be
afforded great deference, treating the determination that a
seizure has occurred as a factual finding would result in trial
judges merely making one finding—"the defendant was seized."
We note, however, that we see no analytical distinction
among a trial court's determinations of when a seizure occurs,
of reasonable suspicion, or of voluntary consent for purposes
of the applicable standard of review. Thus, one could argue
that since prior Utah authority, as well as substantial
authority from other state and federal jurisdictions, has
treated reasonable suspicion and voluntary consent as factual
determinations to be reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard, we must adopt that standard to review a determination
of if or when a seizure occurred. See infra notes 6 & 8.
4. The trial court found "defendant freely and voluntarily
consented to the police requests at least through the point of
his voluntarily raising his shirt and disclosing to the police
the masking tape that was bound around his body." We

Although the judge found defendant voluntarily consented
to both the search of his bag and his person, this was not the
necessary inquiry. Indeed, it is easy to conceive a situation
where an individual involved in an encounter with the police
would not feel free to leave but nevertheless would voluntarily
consent to a search during his seizure. While the tests for
evaluating the voluntariness of consent to search and the
nature of an encounter are similar and may overlap, they are
not identical and merit separate consideration.
See United
States v. Maraah, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied,
U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 214 (1990).
In light of the authority we have reviewed, and based upon
the factual record before us, we believe a reasonable person
would not have felt free to leave at the point where he had
been stopped and detained by two men who identified themselves
as narcotics officers and one officer searched his person while
the other was already simultaneously searching his belongings.
We therefore conclude that defendant was seized for purposes of
the fourth amendment at least at the point where Fullmer
conducted a pat-down search of defendant.
See State v.
TruiiUP, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
REASONABLE SUSPICION
Our inquiry does not end with our conclusion that
defendant's encounter with the officers escalated into a
seizure or a level two stop. We must now determine whether
defendant's temporary detention was justified, that is, whether
it was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion to
believe he was engaged in criminal activity.
See State v.
Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("[i]n order to
justify this seizure, Officer [] must point to specific,
articulable facts which, together with rational inferences
drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to
conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a
crime."); see also Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
(Footnote 4 continued)
understand this determination to be directed to defendant's
several consents to search rather than to the issue of
seizure. However, even if we were to stretch to translate this
as a determination that the defendant remained throughout the
encounter "in the spirit of cooperation with the officers'
investigation," not because of the officers' "show of
authority," we would find the determination error under either
a correction of error or a clearly erroneous standard.

In the instant case, the trial judge expressly stated that
there was no reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was
transporting narcotics at the time the officers conducted a
pat-down search of his person. Specifically, the trial judge
states:
1. The Court specifically discredits the
officers ability to form a reasonable
articulate suspicion prior to the time of
the defendant's failure to provide an
identification upon request.
2. The Court concludes that the absence
or the failure of the defendant to produce
identification also was not by itself, or
in the aggregate with the previously
listed factors, sufficient to indicate a
reasonable articulable suspicion.
3. The Court further concludes that the
officer's perception of a line just at or
above the defendant's waist, but under his
outer clothing, was not a reasonable
articulable suspicion by itself or in
combination with anything
previously
noted.5
4. The Court further concludes that the
pat down search and observations made by
5.
This conclusion does not specifically deal with the
officer's testimony that he had "on numerous occasions over
[his] fourteen years in this business seen narcotics taped to
people's midsections and back and sides," and thus his
expressed concern that the line "might" be tape securing
narcotics.
Although the officer's testimony is certainly
relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion, the
officer also testified he "definitely didn't know exactly what
[the line] was," and it could just as likely have been "shorts
or something else." The trial court was able to observe the
demeanor of the officer testifying and could have properly
determined that his preliminary suspicions were still more in
the nature of a "hunch" and had not risen to the requisite
level of reasonable suspicion. This probably explains why the
state does not challenge this determination on appeal and is
why we find no error in it either.

the officers, including the feeling of the
bulge, at that time was not sufficient to
constitute a reasonable suspicion either
alone or in the aggregate.
On appeal, the state does not challenge the trial judge's
findings or conclusions as to reasonable suspicion, and we find
no error in them.6
Accordingly, we conclude defendant was
unreasonably seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
6. Because the state has not challenged the trial judge's
determinations as to reasonable suspicion, we have not focused
on the appropriate standard of review we should apply in
reviewing them. The trial judge labeled his determinations on
reasonable suspicion as "conclusions of law." Generally, we
review conclusions of law under a correction of error
standard. See State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 43 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Again, however, we are puzzled by what standard of review
we should apply in reviewing a trial court's determination of
reasonable suspicion. The Utah Supreme Court has previously
treated a determination of reasonable suspicion as a factual
finding, indicating that determinations of reasonable suspicion
are properly reviewed by appellate courts under a clearly
erroneous standard. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183
(Utah 1987) ("In determining whether the facts support a
reasonable suspicion . . . , a trial court must consider the
totality of the circumstances facing the officers.
The
reviewing court should not overturn the trial court's
determination unless it is clearly erroneous.") (citations
omitted).
This court has followed the supreme court's
directive and has applied the clearly erroneous standard in
comparable situations.
See, e.g. , State v. Grovier, No.
900329-CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah Ct. App. March 7, 1991)
(applying clearly erroneous standard to review determination
that reasonable suspicion existed); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d
431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (whether reasonable suspicion
existed to justify an investigatory detention presents a
question of fact reviewable under a clearly erroneous
standard); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(whether seizure supported by reasonable suspicion reviewed
under clearly erroneous standard).
Analytically, however, we are inclined to agree with the
trial court that a determination of reasonable suspicion more
logically falls into the conclusion of law category. See supra
note 3 and infra note 8; see also Hayes v. State, 785 P.2d 33,
36 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion is mixed
question, factual findings upheld unless clearly erroneous, but
ultimate conclusion is subject to <i£ novo review)*

CONSENT
Nevertheless, we continue our inquiry as the state
contends defendant's voluntary consent purged any prior
violation of his fourth amendment rights. Although a
warrantless search is generally violative of the fourth
amendment, it is well settled that "one of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant
and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to
consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973);
see State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); State v.
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. No.
900238 (Utah Oct. 23, 1990).
In determining whether a consent to search is lawfully
obtained following a fourth amendment violation, a two prong
test must be met for the evidence to be admissible: "(1) the
consent must be voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not
be obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality."
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688). The state carries the burden
of proving both prongs of the test. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
at 222; Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 687; State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

A.

voluntariness

Voluntariness of consent is a fact sensitive issue to be
determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. See
Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887; Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 (citing United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980)). This includes
the specific characteristics of the accused and the details of
the police conduct involved. Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 689.
In Marshall, this court set forth the standard previously
adopted by the tenth circuit for determining whether the
government had sustained its burden of proving voluntary
consent.
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony
that
the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and
intelligently given"; (2) the government
must prove consent was given without
duress or coercion, express or implied;
and (3) the courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver

of fundamental constitutional rights and
there must be convincing evidence that
such rights were waived.
791 P.2d at 887-88 (quoting United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d
883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)); HeJbb# 790 P.2d at 82. '
The Utah Supreme Court has provided some guidance as to
what factors may indicate a lack of coercion, including: M l)
absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2)
the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a
mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner . . .; and
5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the
officer."
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah
1980).
It is also noteworthy that the government is not
required to prove the defendant knew of his right to refuse
consent in order to prove voluntariness.
JJSL; see also
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (not required to .prove knowledge
of right to refuse, but a factor to consider in evaluating
voluntariness).
Defendant initially claims that his consent to the search
of his body was not voluntary because he was in the presence of
7. The state claims the burden of proof needed to establish
voluntary consent is only a preponderance of the evidence. See
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974)
(reviewing voluntariness of consent to warrantless search
"controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should
impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence"); United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.
1990) (rejecting previous clear and convincing standard and
adopting preponderance standard when examining voluntariness of
consent to search); United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377 (8th
Cir. 1990) (using preponderance standard); People v. Harris,
199 111. App. 3d 1008, 557 N.E.2d 1277 (1990); State v. Cress,
576 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell. 576 A.2d 425 (R.I.
1990) .
We agree with the state that this court has not precisely
dealt with the issue of the proper burden of proof required to
prove voluntary consent. The use of the general standard from
Abbott in Marshall and Webb was not directed to the burden of
proof issue. The burden of proof to prove voluntary consent
was not directly at issue in either case. Furthermore, we do
not find it necessary to decide the burden of proof issue today
as the evidence presented to the trial court demonstrates that
defendant voluntarily consented to the searches which led to
the discovery of the cocaine under either a preponderance or a
clear and convincing standard.

two plain clothes officers and was not informed of his right
not to consent. He cites no authority for this proposition.
The trial judge found that "the defendant freely and
voluntarily consented to the police requests at least through
the point of his voluntarily raising his shirt." Defendant has
failed to direct us to any facts in the record contrary to this
determination.
There is nothing in the record to indicate
overreaching or coercion by the officers in obtaining
defendant's consent to lift his shirt which resulted in the
discovery of the taped packages around his waist and their
ultimate removal. There is substantial support in the record
for the trial court's determination that defendant freely and
voluntarily consented to the searches which occurred.8
8. We need not decide the precise standard to apply in
reviewing the trial court's determination of voluntary consent
because we find the determination correct under either a
correction of error standard, commonly utilized when reviewing
legal conclusions, or a clearly erroneous standard, as commonly
used when reviewing factual findings.
However, we are
concerned about the mixed signals this court has given when
dealing with the issue of what the appropriate standard of
review is to review a determination of voluntary consent.
Prior cases from the Utah Supreme Court have seemed to
treat a finding of voluntary consent as a factual finding.
See, e.g., State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) (finding
of fact not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous, but here
"trial court's finding of consent [was] clearly erroneous");
State v, Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (applying
totality of circumstances test to evaluate consent). This is
consistent with authority from other state and federal
jurisdictions. See, e.q. , Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 249 (1973) ("Voluntariness [of consent] is a question of
fact to be determined from all the circumstances . . . . M ) ;
United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383, 387 (D.C. Cir) (trial
court's "conclusion" that defendant voluntarily consented
subject to clearly erroneous standard), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 1831 (1990); United States v. Galberth, 846
F.2d 983, 987-88 (5th Cir.) (determination of voluntary consent
subjected to clearly erroneous standard), cert, denied, 488
U.S. 865 (1988); United States v. Borvs, 766 F.2d 304, 314-15
(7th Cir. 1985) (applying clearly erroneous standard), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986); United States v. Espinosa, 787
F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Recalde, 761
F.2d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying clearly erroneous
standard); People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1984)
(voluntariness is a question of fact); State v. Ruden, 245 Kan.

B.

Taint of Illegal Detention

Defendant nevertheless argues that his consent was invalid
as, even if it was voluntary, it was the product of an illegal
(Footnote 8 continued)
95, 774 P.2d 972, 979 (1989) (voluntariness is question of fact
to be reviewed under clearly erroneous standard); State v.
Flowers, 57 Wash- App. 636, 789 P.2d 333 (whether consent was
freely given is a factual question), review denied, 115 Wash.2d
1009, 797 P.2d 511 (1990); Pena v. State, 792 P.2d 1352, 1358
(Wyo. 1990) (voluntariness is question of fact).
Until recently, this court had also followed a similar
approach.
See, e.g. , State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("question of whether consent to a search
was in fact 'voluntary1 . . . is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances"), cert.
denied, No. 900238 (Utah Oct. 23, 1990); State v. Webb, 790
P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (voluntariness of consent is a
question of fact to be disturbed "only if the appellant
demonstrates there has been clear error").
Recently, however, a panel of this court adopted a
two-prong analysis for reviewing voluntary consent to search in
State v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme). In Bobo, the panel set
out a two-part standard to employ when reviewing a trial
court's determination of voluntary consent.
"[T]he factual
findings leading to the trial court's determination that
defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his home are
considered for clear error and the legal conclusion of
voluntary consent premised upon those facts is examined for
correctness." See id. (citing Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658,
659 (Utah 1988)).
This approach was followed in State v.
Haroraves, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood).
Subsequently, however, this court has returned to
reviewing a determination of voluntary consent under a clearly
erroneous standard.
See, e.g., State v. Grovier, No.
900329-CA, slip op. at 7 & n.l (Utah Ct. App. March 7, 1991)
(Judges Bench, Jackson, and Russon) (expressly rejecting the
Bobo approach and reviewing voluntary consent to search as only
a question of fact); State v. Sterger, No. 900078-CA, slip op.
at 7, n.5 (Utah Ct. App. March 6, 1991) (Judges Bench, Jackson
and Russon). Since several of the judges concurring in Bobo
and Hargraves have since returned to the clearly erroneous
standard, it may be that they, like the author, have only
recently focused on the issue. (Footnote 8 continued on page
16)

stop and detention.
Even where the government proves the
consent is voluntary, such consent cannot justify a search if
(Footnote 8 continued)
Although the great weight of authority supports treating a
determination of voluntary consent as a factual finding, we
find the bifurcated approach articulated in Bobo analytically
sound. It has also been adopted by at least one other state
appellate court. Boraen v. State, 58 Md. App. 61, 472 A.2d
114, 123 (viewing issue of voluntary consent "we give great
weight to the findings of the hearing judge as to specific,
first-level facts (such as • the time that an interrogation
began, whether a meal was or was not served, whether a
telephone call was requested) [but] make our own independent
judgment as to what to make of those facts; we must, in making
that independent judgment resolve for ourselves the ultimate
second-level
fact—the
existence or non-existence of
voluntariness."), cert, denied, 300 Md. App. 483, 479 A.2d 372
(1984).
This two step analysis is consistent with our prior
directives to trial courts to make detailed basic factual
findings rather than conclusory statements.
See State v.
Loveoren, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(detailed findings necessary to facilitate meaningful appellate
review); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
It seems to defeat the purpose of appellate review if a trial
court is permitted to make only one ultimate factual
"finding"—"the defendant voluntarily consented to the
search." Yet, we do acknowledge that the issue of voluntary
consent is extremely fact sensitive and trial judges may
arguably be in the best position to determine voluntary consent
after hearing all the evidence. A trial judge may not be able
to articulate exactly what prompted the determination that one
consent was voluntary while another was coerced, but the judge
knows or senses the difference after hearing first-hand the
testimony offered and perceiving the nuances and subtleties of
that testimony. There may be sound policy reasons to ignore
the more analytically precise approach advocated by Bobo and to
simply defer to the trial court even though technically a
determination of voluntary consent is more akin to a legal
conclusion.
In sum, we believe that the standard of review to be
applied when reviewing a trial court's determination of
voluntary consent, reasonable suspicion, or when a seizure
occurs should be definitively determined by the Utah Supreme
Court in order to put to rest the conflicts between panels of
this court and alleviate the confusing state of the law on
these continually recurring issues.

the consent was obtained through the exploitation of an
antecedent police illegality.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91.
Thus, if an antecedent police illegality exists, the government
must establish that the otherwise voluntary consent is
sufficiently attenuated to have purged the taint of the
original police illegality. Id.
In Arroyo, the supreme court recognized several factors
that merit consideration when determining if consent was
obtained as a result of an exploitation of a prior illegality.
These factors include Miranda warnings, temporal proximity of
the illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening
circumstances, and the flagrancy of the illegality. See id. at
690-91 & n.4. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04,

and 3 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(d), at 193-94 (2d ed.
1987)); see also State v. Sims, No. 890463-CA, slip op. (Utah
Ct. App. March 15, 1991).
In the instant case, the trial judge ruled on defendant's
motion to suppress prior to the Utah Supreme Court's adoption
of the "exploitation of the prior illegality" analysis for
evaluating consent to search in Arroyo. Under then existing
Utah case law, no such independent exploration was required.
£££ State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
overruled, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Thus, neither counsel nor
the trial judge had the benefit of the supreme court's
analysis. Therefore, the trial judge did not address the issue
of whether defendant's consent was sufficiently attenuated from
what we have determined on appeal to be an illegal detention.
The undisputed facts in the record establish that the
consensual search which resulted in the ultimate discovery of
the drugs occurred after an illegal detention.9
Defendant
raised his shirt displaying the tape around his middle at a
time both the trial court and this court have concluded the
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him.
There were no Miranda warnings, or other intervening
circumstances documented in the record between the time of his
illegal seizure and the ultimate discovery of the contraband.
9. The trial judge concluded there was reasonable suspicion to
support defendant's detention after he lifted his shirt,
displaying the tape, and his explanation for the tape was
illogical.
However, defendant had previously been seized
without supporting reasonable suspicion during the pat-down
search prior to the lifting of his shirt.

On the uncontroverted facts in the record before us, we
conclude that defendant's consent was tainted by the prior
illegal seizure as a matter of law and, therefore, that the
contraband should have been suppressed.
In sum, we conclude that although defendant's initial
encounter with the narcotics officers was a level one,
voluntary or consensual encounter, it escalated to a level two
seizure at least at the point Fullmer physically searched
defendant by conducting a pat-down search while Palmer was
simultaneously searching defendant's belongings. We further
uphold the determination of the trial judge that the officers
did not have reasonable suspicion to suspect defendant was
transporting illicit drugs at the time he was seized. Such a
level two stop in the absence of reasonable suspicion amounts
to a violation of defendant's fourth amendment right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure. This constitutional
violation is not necessarily cured by defendant's voluntary
consent to the searches which exposed the contraband. We find
the subsequent searches which exposed the contraband, although
pursuant to voluntary consent, on the facts in the record, were
not sufficiently attenuated to be purged of the effect of the
prior illegal seizure.
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